Issue 9 February - May 2002by Claude Kambuya Kabemba

After South Africa’s political dispensation in 1994, the process of gradual unification of Southern Africa, through economic integration and common political and security structures, was supposed to continue without major hindrances. The negotiation of a trade protocol and the organ of politics and security were considered to be the most important challenges. The common vision that characterised the Front Line States and the Liberation movements in the region, created hope that the region would be able to meet, and successfully overcome, these challenges. SADCC was the symbol and tangible embodiment of the political economy of Southern Africa liberation.

The building of a united Southern Africa—free from apartheid—was envisaged to bring about integration of the economy and strengthen political unity. However, what we did not know was that disparity in political belief and commitment to national economic interests would threaten the integration process.

The question of a trade protocol for the Southern African Development community, of which all countries of the region are part, is a very important issue. Trade in the region is made up of two components. One takes place within the framework of the Southern African Customs Union, the other takes place within SADC. At present, the latter is conducted almost entirely on a bilateral basis, through separate and distinct bilateral trade agreements. However, a trade protocol that will regulate trade in the region is almost ready for adoption by all member states. The fact that today we have a trade protocol ready for endorsement by all governments in the region, means that there is enough consensus amongst the regional leaders to make regional integration, particularly trade regulation, inescapable.

The regional economic development leg of SADC is generally well established, although in urgent need of streaming and reinvigoration. Economic relations in the region are very asymmetric, with South Africa receiving most of the benefits; followed by Zimbabwe. Indeed South Africa commands an economy four times the size of the rest of the SADC economies combined. More and more however, people in South Africa, and in the region as a whole, regard SADC as a failure. They cite the consistent decline in intra-SADC trade and capital flows vis-a-vis third markets as well as the increased trade and capital flows between SADC and South Africa in favour of the latter. Another body of opinion found within South Africa argues that South Africa should instead try to integrate with the Indian Ocean Rim because SADC has nothing to offer its more developed industry. This view applauded the EU-South Africa trade deal without questioning its impact on SADC. Now that SA has opened its market to the EU, it appears that other SADC countries would have to compete with highly competitive EU companies in the SA market on an equal basis, making SADC an institutional chapeau for EU products.

Market integration in Southern Africa has failed due to the relative absence of what neo-functional theorists call “favourable background conditions”. Evidence suggests that for lasting economic integration, all member countries must be at a similar stage of economic development. It is unlikely that complete trade and factor market integration is more feasible today, or will be so in the near future. This does not mean that African states lack interdependence. On the contrary, the dismantling of customs barriers lags behind the dynamism of informal trade. About 40% of traders in sub-Saharan Africa make their living by passing through borders, taking advantage of tariff differences, and diminishing the relevance of trade regulation or deregulation.

The economic woes of Zimbabwe, South Africa’s major African trading partner, are having a negative impact on intra-regional trade. President Mbeki is cognisant of the fact that SA dominates intra-regional trade. In his characteristic candour, Mbeki has singled out Zimbabwe—SA’s relatively strong neighbour—for failing to redress this trade imbalance of 1:4 ratios, in SA’s favour. He says this has gone up from a 1:2 ratio five years ago. SA’s dominance, he says, is hardly a conspiracy, but an inevitable consequence of the region not working ceaselessly to improve trade, [and] improve [its] capacity to export. For instance, he says, Zimbabwe is failing to meet its textiles export quota to SA under existing bilateral trade agreements, and is straining to produce for export. The argument here is that the economic weakness and relative stagnancy of African economies are a major obstacle to trade increase. The economic crisis that many countries of the region are in poses a serious threat to the free trade pact of the SADC. Although the trade agreement has been constituted in a manner that countries can enter it as they are able to enter it, it appears that no country will enter it soon. Even Zimbabwe—the second largest economy in SADC—would have to reduce the pace with which it enters.

Zimbabwe often complains that SA denies its neighbours’ goods access to its markets by continuing to impose high tariffs. This has been one of the sore points in the diplomatic relations of the two countries. In fact, the textile question is one of the outstanding issues in the SADC free trade negotiations. One wonders then if Mbeki is misinformed, or is setting the record straight on the intra-regional trade issue.

All the same, SADC negotiations to create a free trade area are advancing, and the negotiations are making good progress on tariff reduction schedules. To redress trade imbalance with the region, SA has made a non-reciprocal commitment to remove import duties on SADC goods in five years. In late 1999, the trade and industry department predicted that these negotiations would be concluded in January 2000. Unfortunately this did not materialise. As hinted at above, the negotiations are bogged down on the “rules of origin” pertaining to the clothing and textile sectors. SA negotiators insist on this point because of the potential danger in labelling of goods imported into the region from East Asia and then exported to SA.

There appears to be a convergence of views on the rules of “ two-stage” beneficiation, which entails a greater degree of beneficiation of (textile) raw materials within the SADC region. The attractiveness of this approach is that it promises to spur economic activity and, at the same time, guarantee jobs in the region.

There is also a need to continue questioning the merits and demerits of various regional bodies to which countries in the region are members. More generally the entire rational behind regional organisations seems questionable. First, SADC or SACU have never been subjected to the will of the people in the region. Regional leaders assume that the establishment of grandiose plans in the image of those elsewhere in the world without adapting them to regional dynamics will transform African society and economies. Again a tendency by domestic elite to look elsewhere for panaceas may be the cause. The tendency in the region is that integration will bring growth or development to member states. This is a wrong premise on which to start development. Development, to be sustainable, would have to be initiated and conducted from inside the different countries through appropriate macro-economic policies and social policies. SADC needs a realistic appraisal of what can be achieved together, based on workable proposals and multilateral approaches appropriate to the region.

There is debate today as to whether or not SADC is an accessible and transparent organisation. The SADC has been resisting opening itself to popular participation in its structures. As we discuss this issue, we do not know how sympathetic communities are to organisations such as SACU (Southern African Customs Union), SADC and COMESA and their views on the South African dominance of trade relations in the region. In fact, the position of the people of Southern Africa has never been tested as to whether there should be economic integration in the region. Governments in the region assume that the people have accepted the idea. SADC’s protocol on sharing water has prompted nationalist reactions from Zambia and Zimbabwe. In some states, such as South Africa, serious resistance exists against the reduction of tariffs on textiles from trade unions that complicate attempts at integration which seems to stem more from the pretensions of elite, who revel more in the trapping of interstate bodies, than the preferences of citizens. The level of xenophobia reveals that people are still not prepared, or are not well informed/educated enough on the process of integration.

Besides the developmental issue, there exists another dimension to integration. SADC is slowly developing into a sub-regional political security unit. Increasingly, a new security paradigm seems to be emerging on the continent. This consists of regions accepting co-responsibility and sharing the burden to police themselves as UN capacity and willingness to act continues to be questioned. This is an important move. Given the salient of political stability, conflict management may be a far more pressing task for regional co-operation than economic integration. While there is increasing interest in attempts to manage conflict, divergent approaches on how to resolve it continues to paralyse SADC political and economic relations.

The military intervention of some SADC members—Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola—in the DRC conflict has been criticised by others as being a wrong move which has only helped to fuel conflict. The dichotomy in approach did not start with this second war in the DRC, but rather with the first one. The Mandela mediation was diametrically opposed to Robert Mugabe’s efforts to rally a SADC response during Laurent Kabila’s assault on Kinshasa in May 1997. The intervention of two SADC members—South Africa and Botswana—in Lesotho received cold interest from other members. Strong critics of the South African military intervention say that the move contradict South Africa’s stance that preference should be accorded to early warning mechanisms, preventive diplomacy and mediation as the way to resolving conflicts in the region.

Despite these differences, there is a strong consensus that a common approach, which stresses that common security is the way to go, and that the persistence of armed disturbances should be the highest priority for SADC. This requires, as a matter of urgency, the creation of a sustainable SADC Peace Support operation to deal with security matters. Despite all this, the search for internal and external security rests in the hands of each national state. South Africa seems to have understood this when it decided to purchase arms wealth of more than R30 billion. In the presence of countries—Angola, DRC, Zimbabwe—seriously increasing their military capabilities, South Africa’s military power in the region could not remain inactive and watch other countries reach a position where they could challenge its supremacy. Also, this move by the South Africans, although not having created negative reactions, would push countries in the region to consider increasing their military budgets, with serious implications on social economic expenditure.

Today political and security dimensions receive a great deal of attention from the regional leaders. This is understandable as there cannot be regional economic integration without sustainable peace. But there hasn’t been conclusive understanding in Southern Africa as to how much political autonomy the governments in Southern African states should retain and how much power they should share with governments of other Southern African states. When we speak about economic, political and military integration in the region, it is a tacit acceptance by governments and the people they represent that other states in the region should be able to influence decisions of the government of a member state. This infers the involvement of other countries in the national and foreign policy-making of a member state, thus influencing the outcome. However, there is no clarity as to how much political integration between the states of the region is required to make regional economic integration between states of Southern Africa possible.

Conclusion
There are serious confrontations that characterise trade between states in the region. Differences also exist on how to deal with regional security matters. Should we therefore infer from such situations that nothing has changed since the end of apartheid and the introduction of democracy in most SADC countries? Are we witnessing, all of a sudden, the end of the alliance and good atmosphere that characterised the Front Line States and the beginning of a new period, which we don’t yet know how to define and to describe? The main question now is whether SADC member states are going to take their cue from the theories of complex interdependence rather than political realism that seems to characterise trade and military relations in the region. The SADC has to take account of such queries. Any forecast is premature, but we can analyse the past to try to understand the future.

Author's Contact Details
Author: Claude Kambuya Kabemba
Tel: +27 11 482 5495
Fax: +27 11 482 6163
Email: claude@eisa.org.za